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NOTES AND COMMENT
serve as a warning to future testators to so frame their charitable
intent as to fall within the confines of charitable trusts recognized
to-day.
ANTHONY CURRERI.

EFFECT OF ExTRiNsic ACCELERATION AGREEMENT UPON
ACCOMMODATION INDORSER'S OBLIGATION.

In a recent New York case,' the plaintiff was the payee-holder
of a series of four promissory notes, payable at monthly intervals.
The defendant was an accommodation indorser of the second and
third notes in the series. These had been signed before delivery and
plaintiff took with knowledge as to the nature of defendant's liability.
Contemporaneously with the delivery of the notes to plaintiff by the
maker, an acceleration agreement, providing that all four notes would
be due and payable immediately upon default in payment of any one,
was made and entered into without the knowledge or consent of the
defendant herein. Default in payment of the first note occurred,
whereupon demand and protest was made on all four notes against
all parties liable thereon other than defendant. Upon the due date
of each of the respective notes that defendant had endorsed, demand
and protest were again made, this time as against defendant as well
as the maker. There was a refusal to pay, whereupon action was
commenced.
Upon such state of facts, the Court of Appeals absolved defendant from liability, holding that the acceleration agreement constituted a material alteration of the note, consequently voiding it as
against the non-assenting party. While it is submitted that the decision reaches a correct conclusion, it is urged that the court's
reasons therefor are entirely fallacious from a legal viewpoint.
At the outset, it must be distinctly borne in mind that the acceleration agreement was an extrinsic agreement, not being incorporated
in the note by any physical means whatsoever. 2 Equally well must
it be remembered that no question of fraud is involved herein; indeed
it has been the common practice of the banks, and other lenders, to
enter into just such an acceleration agreement as-was involved herein
whenever there exists a series of notes.3
' Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Steinhardt, 265 N. Y. 145, 191 N. E. 867
(1934), reargumentdenied, 265 N. Y. -, 191 N. E. - (1934).
2 Cf. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LATV (5th ed.) 143, 912, 913.
Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper (1919) 32 HARV. L. REv.
747. As a practical matter, the acceleration agreement is in form a physically

separate instrument inasmuch as there exists some conflict in the cases as to
whether or not the inclusion of such acceleration, or extension, provision in the
instrument itself has any effect upon negotiability. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed.) 139 et seq.
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The acceleration agreement and the note or notes must be viewed
as one inasmuch as
"The rule * * * requires all papers and instruments relating to the same subject and executed simultaneously, to be
read together, and as constituting, when thus read, a single
contract or agreement." 4
Yet the fact-that the two must be considered to be the one contract 5
-- does not alter the result.
Reasoning of the Court.
The case is controlled by the Negotiable Instruments Law, 6 Sections 125 [206]7 and 124 [205].8 By virtue of N. I. L. Section 125
[206], it is to be observed that any change in the time of payment is
deemed a material alteration. It cannot be doubted that the acceleration agreement constitutes a change in the time of payment, and it is
immaterial whether the change be by way of advancement or postponement of the due date. Consequently, there has been a material
alteration within the meaning of the section.
Therefore, the only thing to do is to apply N. I. L. Section 124
[205] which section discharges a non-assenting party to a material
alteration.
"Benedict v. Cowden, 49 N. Y. 396, 401 (1872).
'Decision (1934) 4 BKLyI. L. REv. 89.
'Throughout, whenever reference be made to the Negotiable Instruments
Law (sometimes hereinafter called "N. I. L.") the section of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law will be first mentioned and the corresponding
section of the New York act will immediately follow in brackets.
N. I. L. §125 [2061 : "What Constitutes a Material Alteration.
Any alteration which changes:

(3) The time of payment;
Or which adds the place of payment where no place of payment is
specified, or any other change or addition which alters the effect of the
instrument in any respect, is a material alteration."
'N. I. L. §124 [2051:
"Alteration of Instrument-Effect of.
Where a negotiable instrument is materially altered without the
assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided, except as against a party
who has himself made, authorized, or assented to the alteration, and subsequent indorsers. But when an instrument has been materially altered and
is in the hands of a holder in due course, not a party to the alteration,
he may enforce payment thereof according to its original tenor."

NOTES AND COMMENT
Inconsistencies in the Court's Argument.
A. A physical change on the instrumeit itself is contemplated by
N. I. L. Sections 125 [206] and 124 [205].
An examination of the holding reveals that the key to it is the
word "alteration" as used in N. I. L. Section 125 [206]. The learned
court's determination is that an alteration, not physical in the sense
of not being a change on the instrument itself, is within the purview
of the section. 9 Undoubtedly, that is so from a layman's viewpoint.10
Unfortunately, however, it is without legal basis.
Before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law by the
Legislature of the state of New York, the New York Court of Appeals had said:
"It is desirable for many reasons that the decisions of the
several states upon questions affecting commercial paper should
be uniform, and unless we are shut up to a different judgment
by our own courts, we should apply the rule well established
by authority elsewhere, and sustained by the rules governing
analogous cases, * * *" 1
Such statement constituted fiothing more than a reiteration of a
long recognized truth, which recognition was culminated in the drafting and adopting of an Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law by the
several states. In view of this acknowledged desire for unanimity
as evinced both by the cases and by the adoption of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, the decisions of sister states should be given cdnsiderable weight in the interpretation accorded.
The identical issue, i. e., as to whether N. I. L. Section 125 [206]
is operative only in so far as are concerned physical alterations to the
instrument itself, was squarely presented and decided in Richards
v. Market Exchange Bank Co.12 The court therein said:
' It is noteworthy that the parties themselves did not even consider that
the decision could be based on the grounds of alteration. The counsel, on

argument in the Court of Appeals, did not mention the point until the hearing
of the motion for reargument. See briefs of counsel submitted to Court of
Appeals. Indeed, in the Appellate Division (240 App. Div. 887, 267 N. Y.
Supp. 990 [lst Dept. 1933]) defendant-respondent stated in his brief (at 14):
"Respondent agrees in every respect with every statement made by
appellant on this point. No claim is raised herein of any alteration of
the notes in suit within the meaning of Section 205 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law."
"Funk & Wagnalls, New Standard Dictionary of the English Language,
sub. tit. "alteration."
a' Benedict v. Cowden, supra note 4, at 406.
281
Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E. 1000 (1910).
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"The question thus made is: Does the extension work
a 'material alteration' in the instrument? The argument in
support of the claim that it does is rested upon the proposition
laid down by Brandt on Suretyship, as follows: 'Any agreement between the creditor and principal which varies ** * the
terms of the contract by which the surety is bound * * * will
release him from responsibility.' We think this does not satisfy the requirements of the sections. * * * It does not imply
an alteration of the instrument. * * * It must be borne in mind
as an absolute controlling condition, that it is the instrument
itself which the foregoing sections * * * treat of, not the contract which the instrument is intended to evidence. This, it
seems to us, is so manifest on the face of the printed word
that it can not be more clearly shown by comment, and hardly
needs authority in its support." 1
And in Dart National Bank v. Burton 14 the court said:
"A material alteration, to fall within the Negotiable Instruments Act (Secs. 124 [205] and 125 [206]) must be of
the writing itself."
The text books adhere to the same view that "the addition of a
memorandum which does not purport to form part of the document
itself is not an alteration; * * *."

'5

It is inescapable that "the term

'alteration' in this connection is applicable only to actual changes upon
the face of a written instrument." 16

B. The decision renders N. I. L. Section 120 (6) [201 (6)]
unnecessary.
N. I. L. 120 (6) [201 (6)] provides:
"A person secondarily liable on the instrument is discharged:
*

*

*

*

*

*

"81 Ohio St. at -, 90 N. E. at 1005, 1006.
Mich. -, 241 N. W. 858, 859 (1932); see Huff v. Cole, 45 Ind. 300
(1873) ; Oklahoma State Bank v. Seaton, 69 Okla. 99, 170 Pac. 477 (1910).
' WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1920) §1906; DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §1629.
1 R. C. L. 966: "In the ordinary acceptation of the word an 'alteration'
is a change of a thing from one form or state to another, that is, making a
thing different from what it was, but without destroying its identity. As
applied to written instruments the meaning is restricted to that particular kind
of change in the sense or language which is effected by an act done on an
instrument by Tfhe party entitled to it."
" Note (1903) 16 HARV. L. REV. 511, 512. For further discussion of the
point, see Appellant's brief, Point II, on motion for reargument. Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Steinhardt, 265 N. Y. -, 191 N. E. - (1934).
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"6. By any agreement binding upon the holder to extend
the time of payment, or to postpone the holder's right to enforce the instrument, unless made with the assent of the party
secondarily liable, or unless the right of recourse against such
party is expressly reserved." 17
In theory at least there is no distinction between a collateral extension agreement and a collateral acceleration agreement inasmuch
as both affect the time of payment.' 8 If the one be an alteration
within the meaning of N. I. L. Section 125 [206] the other necessarily must be an alteration. Therefore, under the court's construction, the section would be surplusage for the extension would constitute a material alteration.
This identical conclusion was reached in the case of Richards v.
Market Exchange Bank ' 9 wherein it was said:
"If these sections [§§125 (206), 124 (205)] were intended
to apply to a condition other than a physical alteration of the
instrument, we would expect to find the provisions 'under section 3175-j [§119 (200)], where the subject of discharge of
instruments is specially treated, and we should not expect to
find it elsewhere repeated. We should be slow to ascribe careless aid needless tautology to the law making body." 20
(Italics writer's.)
It is needless to add that the courts should be more than ordinarily loathe to ascribe carelessness and redundancy to this particular statute, so carefully planned and drawn by the most eminent authority on the subject.
Moreover, it will be seen that the decision would have a similar,
though not so drastic, effect upon N. I. L. Section 119 (4) [200
(4) ].21 If an acceleration, or an extension, agreement is to be in2,The words "unless made with the assent of the party secondarily liable,
or" have been omitted from the New York statute.
' Palomaki v. Laurell, 86 Ore. 491, 168 Pac. 935, 936 (1917); STEARNS,
SuRETYsun' (4th ed. 1934) §73.
DSupra note 12.
- 81 Ohio at -, 90 N. E. at 1005.
-N. I. L. §119 (4) [200 (4) ]:
"Instrument-How Discharged.
A negotiable instrument is discharged:

(4) By any other act which will discharge a simple contract for
the payment of money.
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terpreted as constituting a material alteration, it is of course utterly
immaterial whether the person who will be discharged therefrom be
a maker or an endorser-in either event, he will have the note voided
as to him.2 2 Consequently, the decision has the revolutionary effect
of declaring all of the multitudinous decisions rendered thereunder
concerning extensions of time given without the assent of an accommodation maker to be unnecessary, for, if there be an alteration,
then N. I. L. Section 124 [205] is the properly controlling section.
In addition to the contrary case law, the same objection is raised
with respect to the23voluminous discussion on the matter by the various commentators.
The inescapable deduction is that such collateral extension agreements have never been considered as being material alterations-in24
deed, hitherto the matter has not even been mentioned in that light.
C.

The authority cited by the court does not sustain its contention.

The eight cases 25 cited by the court in support of its contention
fail to bear it out, for they all involve physical alterations on the very
27
document in question.2 6

Of the two cases cited for comparison,

neither support. Indeed, the Cambridge case 28 might well be used
to aid in establishing that this was not a material alteration. It was
said therein:
"In cases where it has been held that a material alteration of
a note or other contract avoids it, there has been some change
or interlineation in the paper writing. * * * The memorandum
on the back is evidence of a collateral agreement, and has no
more effect than if it had been written on a separate paper.
Stone v. White, 8 Gray 589." 29

Supra
note 8.
Infra notes
35, 47.
It is submitted that the learned Court might have been misled by a loose
usage of the terms "alteration" and "variation" which, although having separate
and distinct imports, have been used interchangeably by the various courts.
Note (1903) 16 HARv. L. REv. 511, 512.
"Warrington v. Early, 2 El. & BI. 763, 23 L. J.Q. B. 47; Benedict v.
Cowden, 49 N. Y. 396; Greteau v. Foote & Thorne Glass Co., 40 App. Div.
215; State v. Stratton, 27 Iowa 420; Johnson v. Heagan, 23 Me. 329; Gray v.
Williams, 91 Vt. 111; Mertz v. Fleming, 185 Wis. 58."
' N. Y. L. J., Nov. 7, 1934, at 1664. For analysis of each, see Appellant's
brief, Point II, on motion for reargument. Manufacturers Trust Co. v.
Steinhardt, mtpra note 16.
=Cambridge Savings Bank v. Hyde, 131 Mass. 77; Lewis v. Blume, 226
Mass. 505, 116 N. E. 271 (1917).
'Supra note 19.
' Italics here, and in all subsequent quotations, writer's unless otherwise
indicated.
'
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Conclusion.
In summation, it is respectfully submitted that the reasoning
of the court herein is fallacious for at least three reasons:
(1)

The holding has the effect, whether or not so intended,
of rendering nugatory. N. I. L. Section 120 (6) [201
(6)].

(2)

The only alteration within the contemplation of N. I. L.
Sections 125 [206], 124 [205] is a physical alteration
of the instrument itself.

(3)

The cases relied upon by the court do not support its
contention, nor has the writer been able to find any so
holding.

It having been shown that the ground of material alteration is
improper as a basis for the decision, by process of exclusion the only
other grounds for a decision must be found in N. I. L. Section 120
(6) [201 (6)].
A cursory examination thereof reveals that provision is made
therein for the discharge of a person secondarily liable provided that
an extension agreement (without reservation of a right of recourse
as against such person),3O binding upon the holder of the instrument
and without the indorser's assent, is entered into; but there is no
mention whatsoever made of discharge in the case of an acceleration
agreement similarly entered into. Thus, the question arises as to
whether the section is mandatory and exclusive on matters of discharge or whether it is merely directory, restating the common law,
and permitting the interposition of suretyship defenses.
In the first place, it is well settled that an irregular or accommodation endorser occupies the same position as does a surety.31 The
proposition has been questioned inasmuch as suretyship was not a
part of the "law merchant." Such proposition is untenable inasmuch
as that subject did not develop as an entirely separate branch of the
law, as, did equity and admiralty, but rather has been a unique de'Infra

note 53.

'Blanchard v. Blanchard, 201 N. Y. 134, 138, 94 N. E. 630, 631 (1911)
wherein it was said: "The relation, as to the debt, between the defendant and
Flint [plaintiff's testator] insofar as it is involved in this action was that of
principal and surety. Pitts v. Congdon, 2 N. Y. 352; Nat'l Exchange Bank v.
Silliman, 65 N. Y. 475, First Nat'l Bk. of Buffalo v. Wood, 71 N. Y. 405";
National Park Bank v. Koehler, 204 N. Y. 174, 97 N. E. 468 (1912), rev'g, 137
App. Div. 785, 122 N. Y. Supp. 490 (1st Dept. 1910).

Neither today under the statute nor at common law did the relation of
principal and surety exist where the endorsement was made for value. N. I. L.
§29 [55]; Colgrove v. Tallman, 67 N. Y. 95 (1876); Woodruff v. Moore, 8
Barb. 171 (N. Y. 1850).
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velopment within the common law itself.3 2 "This recognition of
fundamental resemblance the courts have evidently followed up by
imposing upon accommodation parties liabilities, and granting them
rights, similar to those of sureties." 3 "Certainly, on first principles
again, the analogy goes far enough, and the situations of the parties
are sufficiently similar to warrant the conclusions that the equities
which release or protect the accommodation party ought to be the same
as those which release or protect the surety." 34
Therefore, in view of the nature of the liability of the accommodation indorser, the question properly reframed is: Has N. I. L.
Section 120 (201) served to deprive an accommodation endorser of
defenses otherwise available to him as a surety at common law? 35
An indiscriminate usage of the term "accommodation party" has
resulted in a confusion and, if not improper, then, at least, unnecessary merger of Sections 119 [200] and 120 [201], in so far as is
involved the questions relating to suretyship. By virtue of definition 36 the term "accommodation party" is inclusive of both accommodation makers and accommodation indorsers. Consequently, in a
general sense, the two are synonymous. Nevertheless, in a particularized sense, their respective meanings and usages have been indicated by Sections 119 [200] and 120 [201].
The Act itself indicates beyond any possibility of doubt that the
distinction between these two types of sureties was deliberately made.
It is found that the definition of an accommodation party given by
N. I. L. Section 29 [55] is qualified by N. I. L. Section 192 [3].37
Raymond, Suretyship at "Law Merchant" (1916)

30 HARV. L.

REv.

141.

Id. at 146. The common law is to the same effect. Hubly v. Brown,

16 Johns. 70 (N. Y. 1819).
Raymond, supra note 32, at 147.
"It is not within the scope of this article to discuss whether or not
N. I. L. §119 [200] has had a similar effect. That point has been the source of
extensive litigation, resulting in such hopeless conflict as to make uniformity
hopeless, as well as a fertile field for the commentators. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (5th ed.) 883-895.

"N. I. L. §29 [55]:
"Liability of an Accommodation Party.

An accommodation party is one who has signed the instrument as

maker, drawer, acceptor or indorser, without receiving value therefor,

and for the purpose of lending his name to some other person. Such a

person is liable on the instrument to a holder for value, notwithstanding
such holder at the time of taking the instrument knew him to be only an
accommodation party."
"N. I. L. §192 [3]:
"Person Primarily Liable on Instrument.
The person 'primarily' liable on an instrument is the person who by
the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All
other parties are 'secondarily' liable."
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This latter section defines one as being primarily liable on an instrument when "by the terms of the instrument" he "is absolutely required to pay the same." Any other party to the instrument not so
situated is secondarily liable. Thus, accommodation parties are classified into two groups, firstly, that wherein there is a primary liability,
and, secondly, that wherein there is a secondary liability.3s This
clear and carefully maintained distinction is indicative of the conclusion that it is not necessary to interpret the one section in connection
with the other.
That the Act does not purport
to be a complete code is evidenced
9
by N. I. L. Section 196 [7] .
It has well been said that:
"The act does not purport to embody all the law relating to
sureties; indeed the word 'surety' does not appear in the text
at all * * *" 40
But is it permissible to introduce evidence as to suretyship rights?
It is to be conceded that the law merchant cannot prevail as
against specific provisions of the Act.41 But the instant situation is
not one which is specifically provided for; rather it is one not so
provided for. 42 While the law merchant cannot prevail as against
specific provisions, it does prevail in unforeseen situations, unprovided for. It would seem as though the proper test as to when to
admit evidence as to the law merchant is: Has the statute spoken
on the subject? If so, then any such evidence is inadmissible; if 4not,
3
then any such evidence may be introduced to fill the gap thus left.
'Obviously, the grouping is dependent upon whether the party appear as
maker or as indorser, it being immaterial as to the actual nature of his liability.
Niotaze State Bank v. Cooper, 99 Kan. 731, 162 Pac. 1169 (1917); Ford v.
Schall, 110 Ore. 21, 221 Pac. 1052 (1924), rehearing denied, 222 Pac. 1094
(1924).
Such is true as to third parties although the relation between the principal
debtor and the indorser be that of principal and surety. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS

(1921) §1211.
IN. I. L. §196 [7]:
"Cases Not Provided for in Act.
In any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law merchant
shall govern."

The New York statute differs in that it is captioned: "Law Merchant;
When Governs" and in the substitution of the word "chapter" for "act."
0
Richards v. Market Exchange Bank Co., supra note 12, 81 Ohio St. at
-,

90 N. E. at 1003; see Haddock, Blanchard & Co. v. Haddock, 192 N. Y.

499, 85 N. E. 682 (1908). But cf. Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 Mass.
205, 98 N. E. 679 (1912).
'The President, etc., of the Manhattan Company v. Morgan, 242 N. Y. 38,
150 N. E. 594 (1926).
N. I. L. §120 [201].
"The President, etc., of the Manhattan Company v. Morgan, supra note
41; Mechanics & Farmers Savings Bank v. Katterjohn, 137 Ky. 427, 125 S. W.
1071 (1910).
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The failure of N. I. L. Section 120 (6) [201 (6)] to mention
acceleration as a basis for discharge cannot logically be deemed anything other than an omission 44 for it is unquestioned that the Act does
not embody all of the suretyship defenses and it is equally unquestioned that it was never so intended. 45 Consequently, the door is
open for the operation of N. I. L. Section 196 [7].
The view of the commentators on the question is epitomized:
"Certain it is that the Negotiable Instruments Law does not
attempt to codify the previously applicable law of suretyship.
It is almost equally certain that its failure to mention suretyship does not excise it from the law of bills and notes." 46
It may well be that N. I. L. Section 119 [200] constitutes such
a specific provision as to prohibit any evidence as to the suretyship
defenses, i. e., any evidence as to the law merchant. On that point
no opinion is expressed.4 7 Sufficient has been shown to establish
that the two sections are not necessarily read together. That being
so, the writer contents himself with the section immediately involved
herein.
In view of the foregoing, the correct view is that suretyship
defenses are still available, at least in so far as is concerned one
secondarily liable. To hold otherwise is "to ignore both the fundamental nature of his (accommodation party's) contract and the purpose of the Uniform Act." 48
What, then, are defendant's rights as a surety?
As a surety, the indorser's obligation is strictissimi juris 49 just

as it was before the passage of the statute. 50

He is consequently

"But cf. Oklahoma State Bank v. Seaton, 69 Okla. 99, 170 Pac. 477
(1910).
' Brannan, Some Necessary Amendments of the Negotiable Instruments
Law (1913) 26 HARv. L. REv. 588, 594; Richards v. Market Exchange Bank,
supra note 12.
"Note (1925) 38 HARv. L. REv. 954, 956; Chafee, Progress of the LawBills and Notes (1919) 33 HARV. L. REv. 255, 277: "Section 120 states other
acts discharging a secondary party but fails to mention several defenses ordinarily available to sureties. Does this mean that a secondary party cannot
set up such a defense? The cases are in serious conflict, but the correct view is
that this section is not exclusive and that under section 196 cases not expressly
governed by the Act fall under the law merchant which includes the principles
of suretyship."
' For an excellent discussion, with copious references, of the point, see
BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed.), supra note 35.
In New York, the question is an open one, the court having twice refused
to pass on the matter. National Citizens Bank v. Toplitz, 178 N. Y. 464, 71
N. E. 1 (1904); Building and Engineering Co. v. Northern Bank, 206 N. Y.
400, 99 N. E. 1044 (1912).
' Raymond, supra note 32.

"National Park Bank v. Koehler, supra note 31.
'Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y. 307, 33 N. E. 311 (1893).
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entitled to have his obligation preserved without variation of risk 51
unless he be acquainted with such change and his assent there to be
obtained, 52 or unless the right of recourse against the surety has been
reserved.53 It is so well settled as to make a citation of authority
needless that a change in the duration of the obligation, whether it
be to hasten or to delay the maturity date, though it be by extrinsic
agreement,5 4 is such a variation. 55
To conclude, then, the extrinsic acceleration agreement can not
be a material alteration inasmuch as it is not a physical change on
the instrument itself. In addition thereto, such construction is improper for it would eliminate any need for N. I. L. Section 120 (6)
[201 (6)]. Consequently, by process of elimination, it is deduced
that a proper decision must be based on that latter section.
In said section there is no provision for discharge in a case
wherein there is an acceleration of the time for payment. Nevertheless, the interposition of such suretyship defense is proper in view
of the fact that the section contains no provision to the contrary.
IMiller V. Stewart, 6 U. S. 233 (1824); Peru Plow & Wheel Co. v.
Ward, 1 Kan. App. 6, 41 Pac. 64 (1895).
Rees v. Berrington, 2 Vesey, Jr., 540 (
).
'Nat. Park Bank v. Koehler, supra note 31, 204 N. Y. at 179, 97 N. E.
at 470: "It is a rule, long recognized, that an accommodation indorser, or
surety, is entitled to have the engagement of the principal debtor preserved,
without variation in its terms, and that his assent to any change therein is
essential to the continuance of his obligation. The reason of the rule is that
his right must not be affected, upon the maturity of the indebtedness, to make
payment and, by subrogation to the creditor's place, to, at once, proceed against
the principal debtor to enforce repayment. Therefore, it is that any agreement
of the creditor, which operates to extend the time of payment of the original
debt and suspends the right to immediate action, is held to discharge the
non-assenting surety; as the law will presume injury to hil; thereby. The
creditor may arrange with his debtor in any way, which does not result in
effecting either of these results. He may take, as collateral to the old note,
new security, or other notes, and, if time is not given to the debtor, the
indorser, or surety, will not be discharged. To prevent such a result, the
agreement must expressly reserve all the remedies of the creditor against
the indorser, or surety; * * *."; Morgan v. Smith, 70 N. Y. 537 (1877) ; Calvo
v. Davis et al., 73 N. Y. 211 (1878); Peoples Nat. Bank of Pulaski v. Hewitt,
226 App. Div. 412, 235 N. Y. Supp. 392 (3d Dept. 1929), modified, 253 N. Y.
523, 171 N. E. 765 (1930).
'Greenberg v. Ginsberg, 82 Misc. 415, 143 N. Y. Supp. 1017 (1913);
Deahy v. Choquet, 28 R. I. 338, 67 AtL. 421 (1907).
'But cf. Hatfield v. Jackaway, 102 Neb. 831, 170 N. W. 181 (1918). The
agreement of extension or acceleration must be binding. National Citizens
Bank v. Toplitz, supra note 47; Ann. Cas. 1913C 527: "Under the law merchant, it was generally held that a binding agreement between the principal
debtor and the holder of a negotiable instrument, whereby the time of its
payment was extended without the assent of an accommodation party, relieved
the latter from all liability thereafter. * * * 1 Am. & ENG. or LAW (2d ed.)
375, 378."
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That being so, the defendant is discharged, both legally and theoretically, of liability for there has been a variation of his risk without his assent and without reservation of a right of recourse against
him.
WILLIAM

RAILROAD RETIREMENT

E.

SEWARD.

AcT.

On June 30, 1934, there was presented to the President of the
United States for his signature a bill which may be the forerunner
of a host of similar legislative enactments affecting the social and
economic condition of the nation. President Roosevelt signified his
approval by signing the bill, thereby creating an Act "to provide a
retirement system for railroad employees, to provide unemployment
relief, and for other purposes". Thus the Railroad Retirement Act,
which the Seventy-third Congress had passed by a narrow margin
and which had encountered tremendous opposition from the carrier
systems of the country as well as various other moneyed interests,
became law.
The purposes of the Act are, according to its own language,
manifold. It is for the purpose of: (1) providing adequately for
the satisfactory retirement of aged employees; (2) promoting efficiency and safety in interstate transportation; (3) making possible
(a) greater employment opportunity, (b) more rapid advancement
of employees in the service of carriers.
Under this Act every employee, including executives, is required
to pay into the Retirement Fund a percentage of his compensation,
except that all compensation exceeding $300 per month is excluded.
The carrier is required to pay a contribution equal to twice that of
its employees. The percentage of compensation to be thus paid is
to be determined by the Railroad Retirement Board, but until otherwise determined, is declared to be 2 per cent for the employees. The
carrier is directed to deduct its employees' contribution from their
compensation and to pay the deducted amounts along with its own
contribution into the Treasury of the United States, which will hold
it in a special Retirement Fund.1
Retirement is compulsory under the Act upon all employees attaining the age of 65, except that such compulsory retirement does
not "apply to an employee who from and after the effective date
(August 1, 1934) occupies an official position". The carrier and the
employee may, by written agreement filed with the Railroad Retire1 Payments into the Treasury of the United States of the amount deducted
and of the carriers' own contribution are directed to be made quarterly, or
otherwise as the Board may order.

